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Abstract
Optimizing the maximum, or average, length of the shares in relation to the length of
the secret for every given access structure is a dicult and long-standing open problem in
cryptology. Most of the known lower bounds on these parameters have been obtained by
implicitly or explicitly using that every secret sharing scheme denes a polymatroid related
to the access structure. The best bounds that can be obtained by this combinatorial method
can be determined by using linear programming, and this can be eectively done for access
structures on a small number of participants.
By applying this linear programming approach, we improve some of the known lower
bounds for the access structures on ve participants and the graph access structures on six
participants for which these parameters were still undetermined. Nevertheless, the lower
bounds that are obtained by this combinatorial method are not tight in general. For some
access structures, they can be improved by adding to the linear program non-Shannon in-
formation inequalities as new constraints. We obtain in this way new separation results for
some graph access structures on eight participants and for some ports of non-representable
matroids. Finally, we prove that, for two access structures on ve participants, the combi-
natorial lower bound cannot be attained by any linear secret sharing scheme.
Key words. Secret sharing, linear programming, polymatroid, non-Shannon information
inequalities.
1 Introduction
Secret sharing, which was independently introduced by Blakley [7] and Shamir [40], deals with
methods to distribute a secret value among a set of participants, in such a way that only some
qualied subsets can recover the secret value. In this work we consider only unconditionally
secure perfect secret sharing schemes, in which the shares of the participants in an unqualied
A previous version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of LATIN 2010 [38]. Several new results have
been added to the current version, as the ones in Sections 6 and 7. Moreover, the overall presentation of the
paper has been greatly improved. This work was partially done while the rst and second authors were with
Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya, Barcelona. Their work was partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of
Education and Science under project MTM2009-07694. The work of the rst and third authors is supported by
the Singapore National Research Foundation under Research Grant NRF-CRP2-2007-03.
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set do not provide any information about the secret. The collection of qualied subsets is
called the access structure of the secret sharing scheme. The reader that is unfamiliar with
secret sharing will nd more information about the topic in the surveys by Stinson [41] and by
Beimel [2]. In addition, some of the concepts appearing in this paper are described in more
detail in [31].
The length of the shares, when compared to the length of the secret value, is usually con-
sidered as a measure of the eciency of a secret sharing scheme. Specically, the complexity, or
information ratio, of a secret sharing scheme is dened as the ratio between the maximum length
of the shares and the length of the secret. The average complexity , or average information ratio,
is dened analogously from the average length of the shares. In every secret sharing scheme,
the length of every share is at least the length of the secret [30]. A secret sharing scheme is said
to be ideal if all shares have the same length as the secret. The optimal complexity ( ) of an
access structure   is dened as the inmum of the complexities of all secret sharing schemes
for  . The optimal average complexity e( ) is dened analogously. Clearly, 1  e( )  ( ).
Determining the values of these parameters is one of the main open problems in secret shar-
ing. Even though many partial results have been found, important questions remain unsolved.
In particular, the asymptotic behavior of these parameters is unknown and there is a huge gap
between the best known upper and lower bounds. Because of the diculty of nding general
results, this problem has been considered for several particular families of access structures
in [8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 23, 29, 32] among other works. And a great achievement has been ob-
tained recently by Csirmaz and Tardos [15] by determining the optimal complexity of all access
structures dened by trees.
In a linear secret sharing scheme, the secret value and the shares are vectors over some
nite eld, and every share is the value of a given linear map on some random vector. The
homomorphic properties of linear secret sharing schemes are very important for some of the
main applications of secret sharing as, for instance, secure multiparty computation. On the
other hand, linear secret sharing schemes are obtained when applying the best known techniques
to construct ecient schemes, as the decomposition method by Stinson [42]. Because of that,
it is also interesting to consider the parameters ( ) and e( ), the inmum of the (average)
complexities of all linear secret sharing schemes for  . Obviously, ( )  ( ). In fact, almost
all known upper bounds on the optimal complexity are upper bounds on , and the same applies
to the corresponding parameters for the average optimal complexity. Even though non-linear
secret sharing schemes have been proved to be in general more ecient than the linear ones [3, 6],
not many examples of access structures with ( ) < ( ) are known.
On the other hand, Csirmaz [12] explained how most of the known lower bounds on the opti-
mal complexity have been found by implicitly or explicitly using a combinatorial method based
on the connection between the Shannon entropy and polymatroids presented by Fujishige [24].
The best known asymptotic lower bound [12] was obtained by using this method. The parame-
ter ( ) was introduced in [31] to denote the best lower bound on ( ) that can be obtained by
this method. We introduce here the corresponding parameter e( ) for the combinatorial lower
bounds on the optimal average complexity.
As far as we know, ( ) = ( ) for all access structures whose optimal complexity ( )
has been determined. This is due of course to the techniques that have been most used until
now. Namely, the combinatorial method, which provide lower bounds on , and several de-
composition methods, which provide almost always linear secret sharing schemes, and hence
upper bounds on . In particular, these are the methods used by Jackson and Martin [29] to
determine the optimal (average) complexities of almost all 180 non-isomorphic access structures
on ve participants. The same techniques were used by van Dijk [16] to nd the the optimal
complexities of almost all 112 non-isomorphic graph access structures on six participants. Some
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improvements in the upper bounds for the unsolved cases were presented in [11, 19].
Determining the values of ( ) and e( ) for a given access structure   is a linear pro-
gram. Both the number of variables and of constraints grow exponentially in the number of
participants. Moreover, Csirmaz [14, Section 1.2] pointed out that the system of constraints is
overdetermined. Nevertheless, linear programming can be used to compute ( ) and e( ) for
access structures on a small number of participants. This method has been applied on access
structures with four minimal qualied subsets [32] and on bipartite access structures [23].
The use of linear programming, whenever it is possible, to compute ( ) and e( ) has two
useful advantages. First, it does not only provide a lower bound on the optimal (average)
complexity, but the best bound that can be obtained by using that combinatorial method.
That is, other techniques are needed if the obtained lower bound is not tight. And second, after
solving the linear program, a polymatroid attaining the optimal value of ( ) and e( ) is given,
which may facilitate the search for optimal secret sharing schemes.
In this paper, we present the results of such a computation on the access structures on ve
participants and the graph access structures on six participants whose optimal complexities
have not been previously determined. Several known lower bounds are improved and, in a few
cases, the value of the optimal (average) complexity is determined. After the publication of the
previous version of this paper [38], Gharahi and Dehkordi [25] presented lower bounds on the
optimal complexities of some graph access structures. Their bounds coincide with the values of
( ) that we computed by linear programming, but a dierent proof is given. For one of those
access structures, an upper bound is given in [25] that makes it possible to determine ( ).
The lower bound ( ) on the optimal complexity is not tight in general. The rst found
examples of access structures with ( ) < ( ) were the ports of the Vamos matroid [4]. An
innite family of graph access structures with ( ) < ( ) was presented by Csirmaz [14].
These results are proved, respectively, by using the non-Shannon information inequality by
Zhang and Yeung [43] and the Ingleton inequality [26]. These and other known information
inequalities, as for instance the ones in [20, 35, 21, 22], are linear inequalities, and hence they
can be added as constraints to the linear program computing ( ). For some access structures,
better lower bounds on ( ) (or on ( ) if the Ingleton inequality is used) are obtained in
this way. Nevertheless, Beimel and Orlov [5] proved that all known non-Shannon information
inequalities cannot improve our knowledge on the asymptotic behavior of the optimal (average)
complexity.
We checked that, for the aforementioned access structures on ve participants and graph
access structures on six participants, no better lower bounds on ( ) can be obtained by adding
the Ingleton inequality to the linear program. Nevertheless, we found in this way three graph
access structures on eight participants with () < ( ). By using in the same way the non-
Shannon information inequalities from [20, 43], we present other examples of access structures
with ( ) < ( ). As in [4], they are ports of non-representable matroids.
Finally, we analyze in more detail two of the access structures on ve participants and
we prove, by using other techniques, that there is no linear secret sharing scheme for those
access structures with complexity equal to ( ). For one of them, we prove the same result
for the average complexity. In particular, this implies that the techniques used by Jackson
and Martin [29] are not sucient to determine the optimal (average) complexities of all access
structures on ve participants.
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2 Polymatroids and Secret Sharing
We use P(Q) to denote the power set of a set Q. A polymatroid is a pair (Q; f), where Q is a
nite set, and f is a map f : P(Q)! R satisfying the following properties.
1. f(;) = 0.
2. f is monotone increasing : if A  B  Q, then f(A)  f(B).
3. f is submodular : f(A [B) + f(A \B)  f(A) + f(B) for all A;B  Q.
The set Q and the map f are called, respectively, the ground set and the rank function of
the polymatroid. A polymatroid is said to be integer if its rank function is integer-valued. A
matroid M is an integer polymatroid M = (Q; f) such that f(A)  jAj for every A  Q. The
independent sets of M are the subsets A  Q with f(A) = jAj.
Let (Vi)i2Q be a family of subspaces of some vector space E. Then the map f : P(Q) ! R
dened by f(A) = dim(
P
i2A Vi) for every A  Q. The polymatroids that can be dened in
this way from a family of vector subspaces are called linear. If S = (Q; f) is a polymatroid, the
polymatroids of the form (Q; cf) for some real number c > 0 are called the multiples of S. The
multiples of a linear polymatroid are called poly-linear .
For a nite set Q, consider a family of discrete random variables (Si)i2Q, where Si is dened
on a set Ei. For every A  Q, we use SA to denote the random variable (Si)i2A on the
set
Q
i2AEi, and H(SA) will denote its Shannon entropy. The map h : P(Q) ! R dened
by h(;) = 0 and h(A) = H(SA) if ; 6= A  Q is the rank function of a polymatroid with
ground set Q. This connection between Shannon entropy and polymatroids was discovered by
Fujishige [24]. Every polymatroid that can be dened in this way from a family of random
variables is called entropic. The multiples of an entropic matroid are said to be poly-entropic.
An access structure   on a set P of participants is a monotone increasing family of subsets
of P , which are called the qualied sets. Since every superset of a qualied set is qualied,
an access structure   is determined by the family min  of its minimal qualied sets. In a
connected access structure, every participant is in a minimal qualied set. Only connected
access structures are considered in this paper.
Let Q be a nite set with a distinguished element p0 2 Q called dealer , and let P = Q fp0g
be the set of participants. Consider a nite set E with a probability distribution on it and,
for every i 2 Q, consider a nite set Ei and a surjective map i : E ! Ei. The tuple  =
(i)i2Q induce a family (Si)i2Q of discrete random variables on the sets (Ei)i2Q. Consider
the polymatroid (Q;h) given by h(A) = H(SA) for every A  Q. In this situation, the tuple
 = (i)i2Q is a secret sharing scheme with access structure   on the set of participants P if
h(fp0g) > 0 and, for every A  P , the following properties are satised.
1. h(A [ fp0g) = h(A) if A 2  .
2. h(A [ fp0g) = h(A) + h(fp0g) if A =2  .
In this situation, every random choice of an element x 2 E according to the given probability
distribution results in a distribution of shares (si)i2Q, where si = i(x) 2 Ei is the share
of the participant i 2 P and sp0 = p0(x) 2 Ep0 is the shared secret value. The polymatroid
S() = (Q; f) dened by f(A) = h(A)=h(fp0g) for every A  Q is called polymatroid associated
to the secret sharing scheme .
The complexity of a secret sharing scheme  is dened as () = maxi2P h(fig)=h(fp0g),
that is, the maximum length of the shares in relation to the length of the secret. The average
complexity is dened by e() = (1=n)Pi2P h(fig)=h(fp0g), where n = jP j is the number of
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participants. It is not dicult to check that h(fig)  h(fp0g) for every participant i 2 P , and
hence ()  e()  1. Secret sharing schemes with () = 1 are said to be ideal and their
access structures are called ideal as well.
Ito, Saito and Nishizeki [27] proved that there exists a secret sharing scheme for every access
structure. The optimal complexity ( ) of an access structure   is dened as the inmum of
the complexities () of the secret sharing schemes for  . The optimal average complexity e( )
is dened analogously.
A secret sharing scheme  is said to be linear if the sets E and Ei are vector spaces over some
nite eld K, the maps i are K-linear, and the uniform probability distribution is considered
on E. For every i 2 Q, consider the subspace Vi = (keri)? of the dual space E. Then
h(A) = H(SA) = log(jKj) dim(
P
i2A Vi), and hence the polymatroid (Q;h) is poly-linear. By
reversing this argument, it can be easily proved that every linear polymatroid is poly-entropic.
As a consequence of the general construction in [27], every access structure admits a lin-
ear secret sharing scheme. For an access structure  , we notate ( ) for the inmum of the
complexities of the linear secret sharing schemes for  . We consider as well the corresponding
parameter e( ) for the average complexity.
Csirmaz [12] used the aforementioned connection between Shannon entropy and polyma-
troids to provide a unied description for the methods previously used to nd most of the
known lower bounds on the optimal complexity. Namely, they can be obtained by using the
fact that the access structure of a secret sharing scheme implies certain restrictions on the
polymatroid derived from the random variables involved in the scheme. More details about
this combinatorial method to obtain lower bounds on the optimal complexity are given in the
following.
An element p0 2 Q is said to be an atomic point of the polymatroid S = (Q; f) if f(fp0g) = 1
and, for every A  Q, either f(A[fp0g) = f(A) or f(A[fp0g) = f(A)+ 1. For a polymatroid
S = (Q; f) with an atomic point p0 2 Q, we dene on the set P = Q fp0g the access structure
 p0(S) = fA  P : f(A [ fp0g) = f(A)g;
which is clearly a monotone increasing family of subsets of P . For an access structure   on P ,
a polymatroid S with ground set Q = P [ fp0g is said to be a  -polymatroid if p0 is an atomic
point of S and   =  p0(S). Obviously, if  is a secret sharing scheme with access structure
 , then the associated polymatroid S() = (Q; f) is a  -polymatroid. If S is a matroid, then
the access structure  p0(S) is called the port of the matroid S at the point p0. If  is an ideal
secret sharing scheme, then its associated polymatroid S() is a matroid, and hence the access
structure of  is a matroid port [9].
For a polymatroid S = (Q; f) and p0 2 Q, we dene p0(S) = maxff(fig) : i 2 Pg andep0(S) = (1=n)Pi2P f(fig), where P = Q   fp0g and n = jP j. Clearly, () = p0(S())
and e() = ep0(S()) for every secret sharing scheme . Moreover, from the discussion in this
section it is clear that, for every access structure  ,
( ) = inffp0(S) : S is a poly-entropic  -polymatroidg (1)
and
( ) = inffp0(S) : S is a poly-linear  -polymatroidg; (2)
and the analogous properties apply to e( ) and e( ). Therefore, the parameter
( ) = inffp0(S) : S is a  -polymatroidg; (3)
which was introduced in [31], is a lower bound on the optimal complexity. Moreover, it is the
best lower bound that can be obtained by the combinatorial technique that has been used to
5
compute most of the known lower bounds. The parameter e( ), which is introduced here for
the rst time, is dened analogously and it is a lower bound on the optimal average complexity.
For an access structure   on a set P , the dual access structure   is dened by   = fA  P :
P  A =2  g. From every linear secret sharing scheme for an access structure  , a linear scheme
with the same (average) complexity can be obtained for the dual access structure   [18, 28],
and hence ( ) = ( ) and e( ) = e( ). In addition, it was proved in [31] that ( ) = ( )
and, by using the same arguments, it is not dicult to check that e( ) = e( ). Nevertheless,
the behavior of the parameters , e with respect to duality is unknown.
3 Linear Programming Approach
We discuss here how the values ( ) and e( ) can be obtained by solving linear programming
problems. Nevertheless, the number of variables and of constraints is exponential in the number
of participants, and hence, this only can be done if the set of participants is not too large.
Observe that, by ordering in some way the elements in P(Q), the rank function of a poly-
matroid S = (Q; f) can be seen as a vector f = (f(A))AQ 2 Rk, where k = jP(Q)j = 2n+1.
The polymatroid axioms imply a number of linear constraints on this vector. If, in addition,
we assume that S is a  -polymatroid for some access structure   on P = Q fp0g, other linear
constraints appear. Since ep0(S) is also a linear function on the vector f , one can determinee( ) by solving the linear programming problem
Minimize (1=n)
P
i2P f(fig)
subject to f is the rank function of a  -polymatroid.
Observe that p0(S) is not linear. Because of that, we introduce a new variable v. Obviously,
( ) is the solution of the linear program
Minimize v
subject to f is the rank function of a  -polymatroid and
v  f(fig) for every i 2 Q.
The feasible region for the rst linear programming problem is

 = 
( ) = ff 2 Rk : f is the rank function of a  -polymatroidg:
Since there exist  -polymatroids for every access structure, 
 6= ;. For the other linear pro-
gramming problem, the feasible region is

0 = f(f; v) 2 Rk+1 : f 2 
 and v  f(fig) for every i 2 Qg;
which is obviously nonempty as well. Therefore, both linear programs are feasible and bounded,
and hence ( ) = minfp0(S) : S is a  -polymatroidg and ( ) is a rational number. The same
applies to e( ).
The number of constraints to dene these feasible regions can be reduced by using the
following characterization of polymatroids given by Matus [34]. Namely, f : P(Q) ! R is the
rank function of a polymatroid with ground set Q if and only if
1. f(;) = 0,
2. f(Q  fig)  f(Q) for every i 2 Q, and
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3. f(A[ fig) + f(A[ fjg)  f(A[ fi; jg) + f(A) for every i; j 2 Q with i 6= j and for every
A  Q  fi; jg.
Moreover, we can further reduce the number of constraints by taking into account that a poly-
matroid S = (Q; f) is a  -polymatroid if and only if
4. f(fp0g) = 1,
5. f(A [ fp0g) = f(A) if A  P is a minimal qualied subset of  , and
6. f(B [ fp0g) = f(B) + 1 if B  P is a maximal unqualied subset of  .
For every A  Q, we consider the vector eA 2 Rk with eA(A) = 1 and eA(B) = 0 for every
B 2 P(Q)  fAg. At this point, we can present a set of linear constraints dening the feasible
region 
 (vectors are considered as columns).
1. eT; f = 0.
2. (eQ fig   eQ)T f  0 for every i 2 Q.
3. (eA[fi;jg + eA   eA[fig   eA[fjg)T f  0 for every i; j 2 Q with i 6= j and for every
A  Q  fi; jg.
4. eTfp0gf = 1.
5. (eA[fp0g   eA)T f = 0 for every A 2 min .
6. (eB[fp0g   eB)T f = 1 for every maximal unqualied subset B.
Both the number of variables and the number of constraints grow exponentially on the number
n of participants. The number of variables is k = 2n+1. If m = jmin j and m0 is the number
of maximal unqualied subsets, then the number Nc of constraints is Nc =
 
n+1
2
  2n 1 + n +
2(m+m0) + 5. In addition, m;m0    nbn=2c by Sperner's Theorem [1].
4 New Bounds
Jackson and Martin [29] determined the optimal (average) complexities of all access structures
on ve participants except a few ones, for which upper and lower bounds were given. Specically,
there are 180 non-isomorphic access structures with ve participants, and they found the optimal
complexities of 170 of them and the optimal average complexities of 165 of them. The techniques
used in [29] provide lower bounds on ( ) and upper bounds on ( ). The value of ( ) is
determined only if these bounds imply that ( ) = ( ). The same applies to the corresponding
parameters for the optimal average complexity. Because of that, the results that are obtained
for an access structure apply as well to its dual. Taking this into account, the unsolved cases
in [29] reduce to the 13 ones that are listed in Table 1, which involve access structures on
P = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g described in the following and their duals. They are enumerated as in [29].
The lower bound on e( 73) was improved by van Dijk [17]. From now on, we unburden the
notation by writing the subsets of P in compact form, that is, 12 instead of f1; 2g.
 min 73 = f12; 13; 24; 35; 145g.
 min 80 = f12; 13; 234; 235; 45g.
 min 82 = f12; 13; 234; 235; 145; 245g.
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 min 83 = f12; 13; 234; 235; 145; 245; 345g.
 min 86 = f12; 13; 234; 45g.
 min 88 = f12; 13; 234; 145; 245g.
 min 89 = f12; 13; 234; 145; 245; 345g.
 min 150 = f123; 124; 134; 125; 235g.
 min 152 = f123; 124; 134; 125; 345g.
 min 153 = f123; 124; 134; 125; 2345g.
Table 1: Our results for access structures on ve participants
Access  e  e Current Number of
structure from [29] from [29, 17] with LP with LP e constraints
 73 =  151 [3=2; 5=3] [3=2; 8=5] 3=2 3=2 [3=2; 8=5] 272
 80 =  18 3=2 [6=5; 7=5] 13=10 [13=10; 7=5] 274
 82 =  107 [3=2; 5=3] [6=5; 7=5] 3=2 13=10 [13=10; 7=5] 274
 83 =  136 3=2 [6=5; 7=5] 13=10 [13=10; 7=5] 280
 86 =  123 3=2 [6=5; 7=5] 13=10 [13=10; 7=5] 268
 88 =  88 3=2 [6=5; 7=5] 7=5 7=5 270
 89 =  113 3=2 [6=5; 7=5] 13=10 [13=10; 7=5] 274
 150 =  40 [3=2; 12=7] 7=5 3=2 7=5 272
 152 =  53 [3=2; 5=3] [7=5; 8=5] 3=2 3=2 [3=2; 8=5] 272
 153 =  30 [3=2; 5=3] 7=5 3=2 7=5 274
By using our linear programming approach, we are able to improve the results in [29] by
determining the values of ( ) and e( ) for all those access structures. The obtained results
are given in Table 1. The entries with an interval correspond to a lower and an upper bound.
Observe that we improved some of the lower bounds on e( ) but we could not improve the
lower bounds on ( ) for any of these access structures. Nevertheless, the exact values of ( )
and e( ) have been determined. Therefore, we know now that no better lower bounds can be
obtained by the combinatorial techniques used in [29]. That is, whether better constructions
of secret sharing schemes are obtained for those structures, or better lower bounds have to be
searched by considering information inequalities other than the basic Shannon inequalities, as
discussed in Section 5. We also included in the table the number of constraints that dene the
feasible region.
1 2
6 3
45
1 2
6 3
45
1 2
6 3
45
1 2
6 3
45
1 2
6 3
45
Γ
6,40
Γ
6,42
Γ
6,43
Γ
6,61
Γ
6,22
1 2
6 3
45
Γ
6,9
Figure 1: Graph access structures with six vertices.
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The optimal complexities of 94 of the 112 non-isomorphic graph access structures on six
participants were determined by van Dijk [16], while lower and upper bounds were given for
the remaining ones. Some of these upper bounds were improved in [11, 19]. By using linear
programming, we have computed the values of ( ) for the 18 unsolved cases from [16], which
improve the lower bounds for six of them, namely the ones in Figure 1. The results are shown in
Table 2. We notice that, by mistake, we did not include the results about  6;22 in the previous
version of this paper [38]. Except for  6;61, these new lower bounds determine the values of
( ). After the publication of the previous version of this paper [38], Gharahi and Dehkordi [25]
presented lower bounds on the optimal complexities of all access structures in Figure 1 except
 6;9. Their bounds coincide with the values of ( ) that are given in Table 2, but they are proved
by using the same techniques as in [16]. Moreover, they present a decomposition construction
of a linear secret sharing scheme for  6;61 that makes it possible to determine the optimal
complexity of this access structure.
Table 2: Our results for graph access structures on six vertices
Access    Current Number of
structure from [16] from [11] with LP  constraints
 6;9 [5=3; 2] [5=3; 7=4] 7=4 7=4 703
 6;22 [5=3; 9=5] [5=3; 7=4] 7=4 7=4 705
 6;40 [5=3; 9=5] [5=3; 7=4] 7=4 7=4 707
 6;42 [5=3; 7=4] no improvement 7=4 7=4 707
 6;43 [5=3; 7=4] no improvement 7=4 7=4 707
 6;61 [5=3; 2] [5=3; 16=9] 7=4 7=4 ([25]) 707
5 Sharpening the Feasible Region
The lower bounds on the optimal (average) complexity given by ( ) and e( ) are not tight in
general. This is due to the fact that the sets in (1), (2) and (3) are dierent.
This is due to the existence of the so-called non-Shannon information inequalities. The
polymatroid axioms correspond to the basic Shannon information inequalities (namely, the
mutual information is nonnegative). Zhang and Yeung [43] presented an information inequality
that must be satised by the rank function of every poly-entropic polymatroid but is independent
from the polymatroid axioms. Many other such non-Shannon information inequalities have been
found since then [20, 22, 35]. Moreover, Zhang-Yeung inequality was used in [4] to present the
rst examples of access structures with ( ) < ( ). The bounds in [4] were improved in [36]
by using the inequalities from [20]. In addition, there exist several rank inequalities, which are
satised by the rank function of every poly-linear polymatroid. The rst one was presented by
Ingleton [26], and other such inequalities were given by Dougherty, Freiling and Zeger [21].
Beimel and Orlov [5] proved that all known non-Shannon information inequalities cannot
improve our knowledge on the asymptotic behavior of the optimal (average) complexity. Never-
theless, since all these inequalities are linear, they can be added to the linear programs that are
discussed in Section 3. In this way, better lower bounds on ( ), or on ( ) if rank inequalities
are used, can be found for some access structures. Dierently to the one in (3), the sets in (1)
and (2) cannot be described by a nite number of linear inequalities [21, 35], and hence the
values of ( ) and ( ) cannot be determined by linear programming.
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In this section, we explain how to use the Ingleton inequality to obtain a linear program
providing better lower bounds on ( ). For a polymatroid S = (Q; f) and A;B;C;D  Q,
consider
I(f ;A;B;C;D) = f(A) + f(B) + f(C [D) + f(A [B [ C) + f(A [B [D)
 f(A [B)  f(A [ C)  f(A [D)  f(B [ C)  f(B [D):
Specically, Ingleton inequality states that, if S = (Q; f) is a poly-linear polymatroid, then
I(f ;A;B;C;D)  0 for every A;B;C;D  Q: (4)
Moreover, according to the main result of [10], a polymatroid S = (Q; f) satises (4) if and
only if
I(f ;A [X;B [X;C [X;D [X)  0
for all disjoint sets A;B;C;D;X  Q with A;B;C;D nonempty. For an access structure  ,
consider the linear program
Minimize v
subject to f is the rank function of a  -polymatroid,
I(f ;A [X;B [X;C [X;D [X)  0
for all disjoint sets A;B;C;D;X  Q with A;B;C;D nonempty, and
v  f(fig) for every i 2 Q.
Since there exists a linear secret sharing scheme for  , this linear program is feasible and
bounded. The solution IN ( ) is a lower bound on ( ). Moreover, it is the best lower bound
on ( ) that can be obtained by adding only the Ingleton inequality to the Shannon information
inequalities.
By solving this linear program, we obtained that IN ( ) = ( ) for the 5 access struc-
tures on ve participants and the 12 graph access structures on six participants whose optimal
complexities are still undetermined. Therefore, the Ingleton inequality does not improve the
lower bounds on ( ) for these access structures. Nevertheless, we explored graph access struc-
tures on more than 6 participants and we found three examples, the graphs in Figure 2, with
IN ( ) > ( ), and hence they are new examples of access structures with ( ) < ( ).
Specically, IN ( 1) = 19=10 and IN ( 2) = IN ( 3) = 13=7, while ( 1) = 11=6 and
( 2) = ( 3) = 9=5.
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Figure 2: Graph access structures on 8 participants with ( ) < ( ).
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6 Ports of Non-representable Matroids
In this section, we use linear programming to extend the results in [4, 36, 39] about the ports
of the Vamos matroid to the ports of other non-linear matroids. Seymour [39] proved that
the Vamos matroid is not poly-entropic, and hence the two non-isomorphic ports V1 and V6 of
the Vamos matroid do not admit any ideal secret sharing scheme. By using the non-Shannon
information inequality by Zhang and Yeung [43], lower bounds on the optimal complexities of
those access structures proving that (Vi) > (Vi) = 1 where presented in [4]. This bounds were
improved in [36] by using some of the non-Shannon information inequalities given by Dougherty,
Freiling and Zeger [20] (DFZ inequalities from now on). In addition, a lower bound on (Vi)
(the same for both structures, because they are dual of each other) are obtained in [4] from the
Ingleton inequality. A construction given in [31] provides an upper bound on (Vi). Specically,
the results in [4, 31, 36] are summarized as follows.
 (V1) = 1 < 19=17  (V1)  (V1)  4=3.
 (V6) = 1 < 21=19  (V6)  (V6)  4=3.
 5=4  (V1) = (V6)  4=3.
These results were obtained without using linear programming. Nevertheless, linear program-
ming was used in [36] to prove that no better lower bounds on (Vi) can be obtained by using
only the Zhang-Yeung and DFZ inequalities. In the Appendix of [37], we nd two matroid-
s, AG(3; 2)0 and Q8, that, similarly to the Vamos matroid, are among the smallest non-linear
matroids. By using linear programming, we prove similar results for the ports of these matroids.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 6 
7 8 
Figure 3: AG(3; 2)0 and Q8
Denition 6.1. The matroid AG(3; 2)0 is dened on the set V = f1; : : : ; 8g. Its independent
sets are all the sets with at most 4 elements except the six faces, the six diagonal planes and
the twisted plane f1; 3; 6; 8g of the cube in Figure 3.
Denition 6.2. The matroid Q8 is dened on the set V = f1; : : : ; 8g. Its independent sets
are all the sets of cardinality at most 4 except the six faces and exactly ve of the six diagonal
planes of the cube in Figure 3. Assume that the diagonal plane f1; 3; 5; 7g is the independent
one.
It is not dicult to check that there are only two non-isomorphic ports of the matroid
AG(3; 2)0, namely AG1 =  1(AG(3; 2)0) and AG2 =  2(AG(3; 2)0). Moreover, AG1 = AG2.
Similarly, the two non-isomorphic ports of the matroid Q8 are Q1 =  1(Q8) and Q2 =  2(Q8).
As before, Q1 = Q2. The minimal qualied sets of these access structures are listed in the
following.
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 minAG1 = f234; 256; 458; 357; 278; 467; 368; 2457g.
 minAG2 = f134; 367; 156; 178; 358; 468; 4578; 4567; 3457; 1457g.
 minQ1 = f234; 256; 458; 278; 467; 2368; 2457; 3468; 3568; 3678; 2357; 3457; 3567; 3578g.
 minQ2 = f156; 367; 134; 468; 178; 358; 1357; 4567; 1457; 3567; 1567; 1368g.
Zhang-Yeung inequality [43] implies that, for every poly-entropic polymatroid (Q; f) and
for every A;B;C;D  Q,
ZY (f ;A;B;C;D) = f(A) + 2f(B) + 2f(C) + f(A [D) + 4f(A [B [ C) + 4f(B [ C [D)
 3f(A [B)  3f(A [ C)  3f(B [ C)  f(B [D)  f(C [D)  0
If we set fA;B;C;Dg = f18; 36; 27; 45g for AG(3; 2)0 and fA;B;C;Dg = f15; 26; 37; 48g for
Q8, then ZY (f ;A;B;C;D) > 0. Therefore, the matroids AG(3; 2)
0 and Q8 are not poly-
entropic, and hence their ports do not admit any ideal secret sharing scheme. By adding to
the corresponding linear program the Zhang-Yeung inequality, or the DFZ inequalities, or the
Ingleton inequality, with the previous choices of the sets A;B;C;D, we obtain the lower bounds
in Table 3. In particular, these are new examples of access structures with ( ) < ( ).
Table 3: Result for AG(3; 2)0 and Q8
Access Lower bound Lower bound Lower bound
structure of  by ZY of  by DFZ of  by Ingleton
AG1 10/9 19/17 5/4
AG2 9/8 9/8 5/4
Q1 9/8 9/8 5/4
Q2 10/9 19/17 5/4
7 An Impossibility Result
Since no better bounds on ( ) can be obtained for the access structures in Tables 1 and 2 by
using Ingleton inequality, one could expect that there exist for those access structures linear
secret sharing schemes with complexity equal to the lower bound ( ). We prove in this section
that, at least for two of those access structures, this is not the case.
If   is an access structure with ( ) = e( ) and S = (Q; f) is a  -polymatroid with
p0(S) = ( ), then h(fig) = ( ) for every i 2 P . This simplies the search for linear schemes
with complexity equal to ( ). We nd in Table 1 two access structures with that property.
Namely ( ) = e( ) = 3=2 if   =  73 or   =  152. We prove in the following that the
complexity of every linear secret sharing scheme for one of these structures is larger than 3=2.
Moreover, for  73, the same applies to the average complexity. Here we consider  53 =  

152
instead of  152. The minimal qualied sets of  73 and  53, which are represented in Figure 4,
are
 min 73 = f12; 13; 24; 35; 145g, and
 min 53 = f12; 13; 24; 34; 35; 145g = min 73 [ f34g.
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Figure 4: Access Structures  73 and  53
The remaining of this section is devoted to prove the following impossibility result. The proof
is quite long and it is divided into several partial results.
Proposition 7.1. There does not exist any linear secret sharing scheme  with access structure
 53 or  73 with complexity () = 3=2. There does not exist any linear secret sharing scheme
 with access structure  73 with average complexity e() = 3=2.
When using linear programming to compute the value of ( ) for   =  53 or   =  73, we
always obtain as an optimal solution the polymatroid S1 and, respectively, S2 that are described
in Denition 7.2. We prove in Lemma 7.4 that these polymatroids are not poly-linear.
Denition 7.2. The polymatroids S1 and S2 are dened as the only  53-polymatroid and,
respectively, the only  73-polymatroid satisfying the following properties.
1. f(i) = 3=2 for every i 2 P .
2. f(A) = 5=2 for every unqualied set A  P with jAj = 2.
3. f(A) = 3 for every qualied set A  P with jAj = 2.
4. f(A) = 7=2 for every A  P with jAj  3.
Lemma 7.3. Let V1; V2; V3 be subspaces of a vector space E. Then,
max
n
0; s 
X
si +
X
ri
o
 dim(V1 \ V2 \ V3)  minft1; t2; t3g;
where s = dim(V1 + V2 + V3), si = dim(Vj + Vk), ri = dimVi, and ti = dim(Vj \ Vk) for every
fi; j; kg = f1; 2; 3g.
Proof. Put t = dim(V1 \ V2 \ V3). Since (V1 \ V3) + (V2 \ V3)  (V1 + V2) \ V3, we have that
dim((V1 + V2) \ V3)  dim((V1 \ V3) + (V2 \ V3)) =
X
si  
X
ri   s+ t  0:
Obviously, t  ti.
Lemma 7.4. The polymatroids S1 and S2 are not poly-linear.
Proof. Take Q = f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5g with p0 = 0. Let S = (Q; f) be one of these polymatroids and
suppose that it is poly-linear. Then there must exist a positive integer c and subspaces (Vi)i2Q
of a vector space E such that dim
P
i2A Vi = 2c f(A) for every A  Q.
Clearly, dim(V1 \ V4) = dim(V1 \ V5) = dim(V4 \ V5) = c, and hence dim(V1 \ V4 \ V5) = c
by Lemma 7.3. Therefore V1 \ V4 = V1 \ V5 = V4 \ V5 = U0.
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Since dim[(V2 + V3) \ V5] = dim(V2 + V3) + dimV5   dim(V2 + V3 + V5) = 5c+ 3c  7c = c
and dim(V2 \ V5) = c, we have that U0 \ (V2 + V3)  V5 \ (V2 + V3) = V5 \ V2. Therefore,
U0 \ (V2 + V3) = f0g because V1 \ V2 = f0g.
The subspace V0 corresponding to the dealer is contained in VA for every A 2  . Therefore,
V0  (V1 + V2) \ (V1 + V3) \ (V2 + V4) \ (V3 + V5) =W
We prove in the following that 3c  dimW  4c. Indeed, on one hand,
dimW = dimf[(V1 + V2) \ (V2 + V4)] \ [(V1 + V3) \ (V3 + V5)]g
= dim[(V1 + V2) \ (V2 + V4)] + dim[(V1 + V3) \ (V3 + V5)]
 dimf[(V1 + V2) \ (V2 + V4)] + [(V1 + V3) \ (V3 + V5)]g
 5c+ 5c  dim[V2 + (V1 \ V4)] + [V3 + (V1 \ V5)]
= 5c+ 5c  dim(V2 + V3 + U0)
= 5c+ 5c  6c
= 4c: (5)
On the other hand, dimf[(V1 + V2) \ (V2 + V4)] + [(V1 + V3) \ (V3 + V5)]g  7c, and hence
dimW  5c+ 5c  7c = 3c.
The next step is to prove that dim[W \ (V2 + V5)] = 2c.
dim[W \ (V2 + V5)] = dimW + dim(V2 + V5)  dim(W + V2 + V5)
 dimW + dim(V2 + V5)  dim(V0 + V2 + V5)
 4c+ 5c  7c
= 2c: (6)
The other inequality is obtained by
dim[W \ (V2 + V5)] = dimf(V1 + V2) \ (V1 + V3) \ (V2 + V4) \ (V3 + V5) \ (V2 + V5)g
= dimf[(V1 + V2) \ (V2 + V5) \ (V2 + V4)] \ [(V1 + V3) \ (V3 + V5)]g
 dim[(V2 + U0) \ (V3 + U0)]
= dim(V2 + U0) + dim(V3 + U0)  dim(V2 + V3 + U0)
= 4c+ 4c  6c
= 2c (7)
In particular, all inequalities in (6) must be equalities, which implies that dimW = 4c. More-
over, the inequality in (5) must be also an equality, and hence
[(V1 + V2) \ (V2 + V4)] + [(V1 + V3) \ (V3 + V5)] = [V2 + (V1 \ V4)] + [V3 + (V1 \ V5)]
= V2 + V3 + U0:
Therefore, (V1 + V3) \ (V3 + V5)  V2 + V3 + U0 and (V1 + V3) \ (V3 + V5)  V2 + V3 + U0.
dim(W \ V2) = dim[(V1 + V3) \ (V3 + V5) \ V2]
= dim[(V1 + V3) \ (V3 + V5)] + dimV2
 dimf[(V1 + V3) \ (V3 + V5)] + V2g
 dim[(V1 + V3) \ (V3 + V5)] + dimV2   dim(V2 + V3 + U0)
= 5c+ 3c  6c
= 2c
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Analogously, dim(W \ V3)  2c. Therefore,
dim[W \ (V2 + V3)]  dim[(W \ V2) + (W \ V3)]
= dim(W \ V2) + dim(W \ V3)  dim(W \ V2 \ V3)
 2c+ 2c  c
= 3c (8)
Finally, since V0 W ,
dim[V0 \ (V2 + V3)] = dim[V0 \W \ (V2 + V3)]
 dim(V0) + dim[W \ (V2 + V3)]  dim(W )
 2c+ 3c  4c
= c;
a contradiction with the fact that f2; 3g is not qualied.
We prove in Lemma 7.7 that the polymatroids S1 and S2 are the only optimal solutions of
the linear programs computing ( 53) and ( 73), respectively. We need two technical results.
The rst one is due to Csirmaz [12], while the second one is proved by using the independent
sequence technique [8].
Lemma 7.5. Let   be an access structure. The following properties are satised by every
 -polymatroid S = (Q; f).
1. If B 2  , and A  B and A =2  , then f(A)  f(B)  1.
2. If A;B 2   but A \B =2  , then f(A [B) + f(A \B)  f(A) + f(B)  1.
Lemma 7.6. Let   be an access structure and S = (Q; f) a  -polymatroid. If a; b; c; d 2 P are
such that ab; bc; acd 2   and b; ac; ad =2  , then f(bc)  3.
Lemma 7.7. If   =  53 or   =  73, there exists a unique  -polymatroid S with p0(S) = 3=2.
Proof. Let S = (Q; f) be such a polymatroid. Obviously, f(i) = 3=2 for every i 2 P since
( ) = e( ) = 3=2. If ij 2  , then f(ij) = 3 by Lemma 7.6 and f(ij)  f(i) + f(j). Clearly,
every 3-subset of P is qualied. Take three dierent participants i; j; k 2 P such that ij; jk =2  .
By Lemma 7.5,
f(ij) + 1  f(ijk)  f(ij) + f(jk)  f(j);
which implies that f(ij)  5=2. Symmetrically, f(jk)  5=2, and hence f(ijk)  7=2. Ob-
viously, this implies that f(ij)  5=2 for every pair ij =2  . In addition, since every 3-subset
contains at least one unqualied 2-subset, f(A)  7=2 for every A  P with jAj = 3. Consider
now three dierent participants i; j; k 2 P such that ij; jk 2  . Applying Lemma 7.5 again,
f(ijk)  f(ij) + f(jk)  f(j)  1 = 7=2;
and hence f(ik) = 5=2. This implies that f(ij) = 5=2 for every pair ij =2   except for 45 for
 73. Therefore,
f(145)  f(14) + f(15)  f(1) = 7=2;
and hence f(45)  f(145)   1 = 5=2. Analogously, f(A) = 7=2 for every A  P with jAj = 3,
and f(A) = 5=2 for every A  P with jAj = 2 and A =2  . Let A be a 4-subset of P , and let
B  A be an unqualied 2-subset. Then A = B [ ij and
f(A)  f(B [ i) + f(B [ j)  f(B)  1 = 7=2;
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and hence f(A) = 7=2. One can prove in the same way that f(P ) = 7=2. All these facts
determine a unique  -polymatroid S.
Lemmas 7.4 and 7.7 suce to prove the rst statement in Proposition 7.1. In order to prove
the impossibility result about the average complexity, we need to analyze in more detail the
properties of the  73-polymatroids that are optimal solutions for the linear program determininge( 73).
Let  be the permutation on Q that interchanges 2 with 3 and 4 with 5 and leaves 1 and p0
xed. Clearly,  induces an automorphism of the access structure  73. Therefore, if S = (Q; f)
is a  73-polymatroid, then S = (Q; f) is also a  73-polymatroid. Moreover, if S is poly-linear
over some nite eld K, the same applies to S. Consider the polymatroid S 0 = (Q; f 0) with
f 0 = (f+f)=2. Clearly, S 0 is a  73-polymatroid. Moreover, S 0 = S 0 because 2 is the identity
map. Finally, if there exists a linear secret sharing scheme  for  73 that is associated to the
polymatroid S, then there exists a linear secret sharing scheme 0 for  73 that is associated to
the polymatroid S 0, and both schemes have the same average complexity. By taking this into
account, Lemma 7.8 concludes the proof of Proposition 7.1.
Lemma 7.8. There exists a unique  73-polymatroid S = (Q; f) such that S = S and ep0(S) =
3=2.
Proof. By Lemma 7.6, f(ij)  3 if ij 2  . Then,
 f(1) + f(3) = f(1) + f(2)  3, and
 f(2) + f(4) = f(3) + f(5)  3.
We have used here that S = S. Combining these inequalities with P5i=1 f(i) = 15=2, we
obtain f(4) = f(5)  3=2, and f(2) = f(3)  3=2, and f(1)  3=2.
By Lemma 7.5,
f(23) + 1  f(234)  f(23) + f(34)  f(3); (9)
and hence f(34)  5=2. Similarly, f(23)  5=2 and f(234)  7=2. In addition, by using again
that  is an automorphism of the polymatroid, f(235) = f(234)  7=2 and f(25) = f(34)  5=2.
Moreover, f(345) = f(245)  f(25) + 1  7=2, and similarly f(134) = f(125)  7=2 and
f(123)  7=2.
We claim f(124) = f(135)  7=2 and f(145)  7=2. Indeed,
f(124)  f(12) + f(24)  f(2)  1
 f(1) + f(2) + f(4)  1
= 1=2 15=2 + f(1)=2  1 (10)
 7=2:
And
f(145)  f(14) + f(15)  f(1)
= 2f(14)  f(1)
 2[f(124)  1]  f(1)
 2[f(12) + f(24)  f(2)  2]  f(1)
= 2[f(12)  f(2)  f(1)] + 2f(24) + f(1)  4
 2f(24) + f(1)  4
 2f(2) + 2f(4) + f(1)  4
= 15=2  4 = 7=2:
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The next step is to prove that f(124)  f(14) = f(135)  f(15) = 1. Observe that f(124) 
f(14) = 1 +  for some   0, and hence f(14) = f(15)  5=2  . Since 1 + f(14) + f(1245) 
f(124) + f(145), we have that
7=2  f(1245)  + f(145)  f(14) + f(15)  f(1)  5    f(1); (11)
and hence f(1)  3=2   . Now, inequality (10) implies that f(124)  7=2   1=2, and hence
f(15) = f(14)  5=2 3=2. By using this last inequality in (11), we have that f(1)  3=2 2.
By repeating this argument, f(1)  3=2   n for every positive integer n, which implies that
 = 0.
Therefore, f(145)  f(1245) by (11), and hence f(145) = f(1245) = f(1345) = 7=2.
Moreover, f(245) = f(345) = 7=2 and f(134) = f(125) = 7=2, which implies that f(25) =
f(34) = 5=2. We can now use (9) to obtain f(2) = f(3) = 3=2, and hence f(i) = 3=2 for all
i 2 P . By far, we conclude the proof of Proposition 7.1.
8 Conclusion and Open Problems
In this paper, we present several results on the optimization of the (average) complexity of
secret sharing schemes that have been obtained by using linear programming. Other results by
using the same technique have been given in [23, 32]. Dierently to these other works, some
of our results are obtained by using non-Shannon information inequalites (as the one by Zhang
and Yeung [43]) and the Ingleton inequalities. Nevertheless, since the number of variables and
constraints in the involved linear programs is exponential in the number of participants, the
power of the techniques applied in this paper seems to be rather limited.
The most obvious open problem that can be posed here is to nish the projects initiated
by Jackson and Martin [29] and by van Dijk [16] for access structures on ve participants and
graph access structures on six participants, respectively. As we saw in Section 5, the Ingleton
inequality does not provide any improvement on the bounds. In addition, the impossibility
result in Section 7 indicates that this is not an easy task.
In regard to that impossibility result, we notice that it does not imply that ( ) < ( ) for
the involved access structures. Indeed, there could exist innite linear secret sharing schemes
whose complexities are arbitrarily close to 3=2. Maybe other rank inequalities dierent from
the Ingleton one can prove that stronger separation result.
Another interesting line of future work is to apply the techniques in Section 6 to other ma-
troids that are not poly-entropic, as the non-Desargues matroids and other examples presented
in [33].
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